ABSTRACT:
Previous research has established a link between turnout and the extent to which voters are faced with a "meaningful" partisan choice elections; this study extends the logic of this argument to perceptions of the "meaningfulness" of electoral conduct. It hypothesizes that perceptions of The comparative study of voter turnout has exhibited an increasing focus in recent years on citizens" perceptions of the competitive context in which elections take place (e.g. Blais 2000; Franklin1996; 2004; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Milner 2002; Norris 2002; 2004) . Most such research has conceptualized the competitiveness of elections in terms of the choices on offer, the decisiveness of the contest, and citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of political institutions. This study extends that line of enquiry by examining another aspect of electoral competitiveness: the degree to which an election is perceived as being a fair contest.
Electoral integrity is a topic that has until recently received scant attention from comparative political scientists. However, a growing body of literature, building on the insights of those involved in the field of electoral assistance and observation, has stressed the importance of confidence in electoral processes in new and emerging democracies (Birch 2007; 2008; Elklit 1999; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Goodwin-Gill 1998, 56-8; Hartlyn and McCoy 2006; Lehoucq 2003, 252; Lyons 2004; Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Schedler 2002a; 2002b; . As Fabrice Lehoucq argues, "[electoral] fraud undermines [citizens"] ability to constrain the actions of state officials. […] to the extent that public officials can corrupt the electoral process, they are less accountable to the electorate" (Lehoucq 2002, 35) . Lack of trust in electoral institutions can therefore erode citizens" perceptions of the legitimacy of other political institutions, it can dent international legitimacy (with possible knock-on effects for donor aid), and in some cases it can even spark civil unrest.
The purpose of this paper is to explore another possible consequence of perceptions of electoral misconduct: its impact on voter turnout. In so doing, the paper sets out to integrate * I am grateful to the University of Essex and to the British Academy (Grant SG-46162) for recent work on electoral processes in emergent democracies and semi-democratic countries with the traditional concerns of electoral behaviorists by suggesting that in democracies old and new, perceptions of the electoral process are part of the broader context of political perceptions that structure the choice of whether or not to vote. The principal argument put forward here is that confidence in electoral conduct has an important and previously understudied impact on the likelihood that voters will go to the polls: when voters are confident that an election will be free and fair, they are more likely to vote, all else being equal, than is the case when they have reservations about the ability (or willingness) of those conducting the election to maintain democratic standards of electoral integrity. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed in a multilevel analysis of 31 elections held between 1996 and 2002 in established and new democracies.
Evaluations of Electoral Integrity and the Likelihood of Voting
Political scientists have long been aware of the association between various measures of regime legitimacy and voter turnout (Clarke and Alcock 1989; Finkel 1985; Norris 2002, 86-98; 2004, 158-9; Powell 1986; Karp and Banducci, 2008) , but there has been virtually no systematic consideration of what is arguably the most relevant aspect of institutional legitimacy: confidence in the electoral process itself. Low levels of popular confidence in the conduct of elections can be expected to shape citizens" approach to the electoral choice situation in a variety of ways.
Specifically, there are several reasons for believing that low quality opportunities for participation might translate into lower quantitative levels of turnout. If voters fear that polls are corrupt, they have less incentive to bother casting a vote; participating in a process in which they material support for this project.
do not have confidence will be less attractive, and they may well perceive the outcome of the election to be a foregone conclusion. There is some anecdotal and survey evidence to suggest that perceptions of the quality of elections are associated with voter turnout in a number of African (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 206-10; Bratton 1998) and Latin American (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Zovatto 2003) states.
1 Yet this relationship has yet to be systematically examined in a cross-national context.
Following Przeworski (1988) and Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) , procedural certainty -in the form of effective, reliable and unbiased electoral institutions -is a necessary requirement for the uncertainty in outcomes that defines democracy. It follows that the establishment and maintenance of electoral integrity involves guaranteeing the indeterminacy election results by safeguarding the reliability of electoral institutions. Violation of integrity occurs when the indeterminacy of the outcome is compromised by the politically motivated application of electoral rules. When this happens, and there is widespread public awareness that it has happened, voters cannot be sure that their vote will be fairly counted, and in some cases they may even be convinced that their vote will not be fairly counted: "as long as electoral governance artificially reduces electoral uncertainty […] electoral processes are unlikely to be perceived as fully democratic, or, by implication, fully legitimate" (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, 11) .
It can be assumed that if electoral integrity has an impact on voter turnout, this will be largely mediated by perceptions of the electoral process, though electoral fraud and related forms of malpractice can also manifest themselves through the direct manipulation of participation. Up to now I have assumed, together with the vast majority of those who study voting behavior, that voters vote on the basis of their genuine preferences over electoral options, and that those preferences reflect their evaluations of the impact of the electoral outcomes on the provision of public goods. But various forms of "undue influence" may increase turnout; if people are bribed 6 to go to the polls or mobilized through clientelist relations, or alternatively if they are threatened with force or loss of financial security should they fail to turn out to vote, then electoral participation can be expected to be artificially high. It is well known that those who seek to "steal" elections often avoid outright fraud and violations of the integrity of the vote act, and focus instead on altering the basis on which voters make their choices (see Lehoucq 2003 and Schaffer, 2007a , 2007b for overviews of this phenomenon). Voters may be provided with particularistic rewards for casting a vote for a certain option, and they must be able to demonstrate that they have voted in order to be able to claim their reward. In other words, manipulative practices that reduce the credibility of the election (and thereby reduce the incentive for voters to participate) may simultaneously alter the material costs and benefits of participation, thereby increasing such incentives.
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We may therefore observe higher turnout in manipulated elections, but it is unclear that this will dramatically alter the relationship between perceptions of electoral integrity and propensity to vote. This is first because it is typically the case that only the votes of a relatively restricted proportion of the electorate can and will be "bought" in any given election, due to the logistic and material costs of organizing mass vote-buying (Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Lehoucq 2003; Molina and Lehoucq 1999; Schaffer 2005 Schaffer , 2007b Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: 19) , and second because those who allow their votes to be bought may be less likely to perceive (or admit) that the election was unfair, in that they have actively colluded with the violation of fairness.
3
All in all, there are reasons to believe that actual electoral misconduct will in some cases increase rates of electoral participation, but that perceptions of malpractice will have the countervailing effect of decreasing it. Which of these forces is stronger is of course an empirical question, that will be addressed in the sections to follow, but for the reasons elaborated above, it is likely that the effect of unfavorable evaluations of electoral integrity will be greater than that of vote-buying in all but elections of the poorest quality.
In rational choice terms, the main insight offered by this analysis is that if vote calculus models (as developed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968 ), Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974 ), Aldrich (1993 , Blais (2000) and others) are to be extended to a wider variety of electoral contexts, they must take into consideration rewards and punishments as well as the perceived likelihood that one"s vote will be fairly counted, accurately included in the vote tabulation, and that the tabulated votes will be accurately reported -in other words, the perceived likelihood that the election will be conducted fairly. If voters perceive that their vote will not offer them an opportunity to contribute to the selection of leaders, they can be expected to discount the utility of the outcome when deciding whether it is worth their while to vote. Furthermore, considerations of reliability are logically anterior to considerations of decisiveness: it only makes sense for a voter to engage in calculations of outcome utility and decisiveness once they have established that there is sufficient likelihood that their vote will be reliably processed. This suggests that the costs of deciding whether to vote will in certain circumstances reduce to an estimation of the probability that the election will be conducted fairly; if this probability is very low, it will be rational for the voter to stay at home, regardless of how much they care about the outcome, and regardless of how decisive they think their vote might be, unless, of course, particularistic rewards are sufficient to outweigh the net costs of going to the polls.
It remains in this section to identify those individual-and polity-level variables that have been found in previous studies to be significantly related to turnout, and which therefore need to be included in the empirical analysis as controls.
At the individual level, the variables that can be expected to impact on propensity to vote can be grouped according to the various theoretical paradigms that have been employed to model 8 electoral participation: resource theories, mobilization theories, and cognitive involvement theories.
Resource theories predict that factors such as age, education level, and socio-economic status ought to be positively associated with turnout; older, better educated members of the electorate and the more affluent in a country have been found to vote with greatest frequency (Blais 2000, 53; Clarke et al. 2004, 237-61; Dalton 1996, 57-8; Franklin 1996; 2004; Norris 2002, 86-96; 2004, 158-9; Powell 1986; Verba et al. 1978) . Early studies suggested that men were more frequent voters than women (Powell 1986; Verba et al. 1978) , while some more recent analyses show that in many democracies women are now more likely than men to vote (Blais 2000, 53; Norris 2002, 86-91) . Mobilization models have demonstrated that an individual"s degree of integration into and mobilization by civil society organizations such as unions, religious groups and political parties increases the likelihood that they will exercise their franchise (Blais 2000, 53; Campbell et al. 1960, 99-100; Clarke et al. 2004, 237-61; Crewe 1981; Dalton 1996, 57-8; Franklin 1996; Gray and Caul 2000; Jackman 1986; Norris 2002, 86-97; 2004,158-9; Pérez-Liñán 2001; Powell 1980; 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Uhlaner 1989; Verba et al. 1978; Verba et al. 1995; Vowles 2002) .
Finally, studies assessing cognitive involvement have found that factors such as political interest and political knowledge make people more likely to vote, as do variables related to legitimacy and regime support, such as external efficacy and satisfaction with democracy (Clarke et al. 2004, 237-61; Finkel 1985; Franklin 1996; Lassen 2005; Milner 2002, chs. 2 and 3; Norris 2002, 86-98; 2004, 158-9; Powell 1986; Karp and Banducci, 2008) . It is worth pausing to consider the extent to which perceptions of electoral fairness are truly distinct from other measures of legitimacy. On the one hand, this variable is perhaps the most direct and relevant measure of legitimacy in the electoral context. On the other hand, if it is simply a proxy for other variables that have long been known to be associated with turnout, then this lessens its conceptual interest to students of electoral participation. As will be demonstrated below, confidence in electoral conduct is distinct from other measures of legitimacy and regime support, and it exhibits an independent influence on voter turnout.
At the aggregate level, institutional, contextual, and socio-political factors have been shown in numerous studies to be linked to rates of electoral participation. As far as electoral institutions are concerned, elections conducted under proportional representation have been shown to have higher levels of turnout than those conducted under other electoral systems (Blais 2000, 28-31; 2006, 115-6; Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crewe 1981; Franklin 1996; Geys 2006; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Karp and Banducci 2008; Milner 2002, ch. 5; Norris 2002, 64-66; 2004, 158-62; Powell 1980; 1986) . Not surprisingly, countries with compulsory voting have generally been found to have higher turnout levels than those where voting is voluntary, all else being equal (Blais 2000, 29-31; 2006, 113; Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crewe 1981; Franklin 1996; 1999; 2004, 133-37; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Norris 2004, 158-70; Pérez-Liñán 2001; Powell 1980; 1982) .Voting facilities, including weekend voting, postal and other forms of advance voting, and voting in special polling places, have also been demonstrated in some studies to influence turnout, though these effects have generally been found to be weak (Crewe 1981; Franklin 1996; 2004, 148; Norris 2002, 77-80; 2004, 173) ; moreover, as Franklin suggests (2004, 148) , they may be partly endogenous, in that states with particularly low levels of electoral participation may introduce vote-facilitating mechanisms as a means of boosting turnout.
A second set of election-level factors that appear to influence aggregate turnout levels are those relating to the political context in which the race is conducted. Following the logic of rational choice theory outlined above, closely fought elections (generally operationalized in terms of the margin of victory of the winner) have been shown by a number of studies to yield higher aggregate-level turnout (Blais 2000, 31; 2006, 119; Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crewe 1981; Franklin 2002; 2004, 133-5; Geys 2006; Powell 1980) . The decisiveness or salience of the election in question -the degree to which the institution elected can control policy-making -has also been found to be associated with higher turnout. Legislative elections in states with bicameral parliaments and/or directly-elected presidents have been shown, on average, to have lower levels of electoral participation in legislative elections than states with unicameral parliamentary systems (Blais 2000: 28-31; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Franklin 1996; 2004, 133-5; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Norris 2004, 158-64 ). An additional political context variable known to influence turnout at the aggregate level is the length of time since the previous election (or the frequency of elections); when people are called out to vote more often, they are less likely to participate in any given election (Franklin 2002; 2004, 133-5; Norris 2002, 65-9; 2004, 158-65) .
Finally, several socio-political attributes of polities are known to be associated with aggregate levels of electoral participation, including level of economic development (citizens in more developed states vote with greater frequency; Blais 2000, 29; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crewe 1981; IDEA 2002; Norris 2002, 44-5; 2004 160; Powell 1980; 1982) In sum, a variety of political, institutional, and socio-economic variables operating at both the individual and the aggregate levels can be expected to predict propensity to vote and will therefore be included as control variables in the analysis to follow.
Data and Methods
The majority well as election-and country-level variables on political institutions. Usable data for they key variables under consideration were available for 31 cases (see Table 1 ). 4 CSES data on these 31
elections were supplemented by aggregate-level data, detailed below. This item might not, on the face of it, appear to be a very promising indicator for predicting electoral participation. The question was asked after the election was over, after respondents had voted (or not voted) and after they had had the opportunity to evaluate the electoral process from start to finish. Their answer to this question may thus partly reflect their experience on or following election day. If this were the case, it would mean that evaluations of electoral fairness were a consequence, not a cause, of turnout. 5 This possibility is discussed and tested at greater length below, but there are several reasons to believe that confidence in the electoral process reflects attitudes and evaluations that have largely crystallized at the time of the election and are unlikely to change significantly thereafter (save in exceptional cases). Most voters (even in new democracies) have experienced a number of elections in their country, and it is unlikely that their views of the fairness or otherwise of the electoral process will be significantly altered by a single electoral event. Furthermore, the factors which make an election "fair" or "unfair", such as the institutional rules and bodies governing the election, the admission or exclusion of candidates, and the campaign, mostly take place before election day itself.
Finally, if perceptions of the electoral process are altered following the election by objective events and reports on the elections in the media, these factors will most likely change the perceptions of all respondents, regardless of whether or not they voted.
The act of voting itself can be expected to affect perceptions of electoral integrity in one of two ways: by increasing the respondent"s stake in the election, and by providing him or her with additional information about the electoral process. In the first case, the concern raised is that those whose favored party or candidate loses the election may have a less sanguine assessment of electoral conduct. Indeed, Chris Anderson and his colleagues find that "losers" in the electoral process are less likely to evaluate the electoral process favorably, even controlling for a variety of other factors (Anderson et al. 2005, 144-59) . 6 In the multivariate analyses reported below, this "sour grapes" interpretation of electoral confidence is controlled for by introducing a variable designating whether or not the respondent reported identifying with the winning party (or the winning candidate"s party). It is worth noting at this point that the mean fairness rating among "losers" (those identifying with a losing party) was 1.95, compared to 1.92 among "winners" and non-identifiers -a very small difference. This difference is significant at the .001 level, yet this is not surprising in a sample of nearly 40,000. Moreover, aggregate-level analyses reveal that "losers" are significantly more likely to give an election a worse rating in only six of the countries 13 included in the dataset (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain).
These findings suggest that "sour grapes" had little potential to mediate impacts on turnout, a conclusion that will be confirmed in multivariate analysis.
An alternative conception of "stake" in an election might be formulated with reference to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) . It may be that, having participated in an event,
voters are more likely to express a positive evaluation of that event, so as to justify their participation. Though studies of the role of voting on other measures of external efficacy have found limited evidence for such an effect (Clarke and Alcock 1989; Finkel 1985) , this hypothesis is nevertheless worth considering.
The former concern -that the act of voting may itself have conditioned views of the electoral process -is trickier to address, but these are several reasons to believe that this effect will be minimal. Voters have multiple sources of information about the fairness of an election, from press reports to word-of-mouth, and the observed performance of candidates and election officials both before and after the election. And though the fact of voting at a polling station that appears to be orderly, efficient, and free of outright fraud may tend to improve voters" perceptions of the integrity of the electoral process, even the most naïve of voters can be expected to be aware that they have "observed" the electoral process at their polling station for a very small proportion of the time it was in operation, and that their sample of one polling place constitutes a poor basis on which to generalize to the electoral process as a whole. Finally, voting may decrease confidence in the election as well as increase it. If voters have to wait a long time to vote, or if conditions in the polling station are chaotic, they may leave feeling that the election was less well-conducted than they had thought, so we can not necessarily assume that voting can in all cases be expected to increase electoral confidence. We can thus be reasonably sure that the question about electoral fairness taps a general view of the electoral process that is not strongly 14 influenced by the vote act itself. We shall nevertheless return to the question of endogeneity in the following section.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to include a direct measure of particularistic incentives, due to the lack of suitable comparative data. In the context of the present analysis, socioeconomic status will serve as one proxy, given that particularistic rewards are known to be particularly attractive to the poor (Callahan 2000; Desposato, 2007; Figueroa and Sives 2002; Hicken, 2007; Schaffer 2002; Shaffer 2007b; Stokes, 2007) . If mobilizing vote-buying is at work, we should expect the poor to vote with greater frequency than the rich, all else being equal, which is contrary to the impact of wealth found in previous studies. A second proxy is the institutional variable of campaign expenditure limits. Though such limits are not always well enforced, we might expect them to have at least a weak downward pressure on vote-buying, in as much as they set a cap on overall spending. Use of proxies is not an entirely satisfactory solution, yet until better datasets are available on phenomena such as these, there is little alternative. Given that the main aim of this paper is to test the impact of perceptions of electoral fairness on voter turnout, this drawback is not as serious as it might seem, though a fuller integration of electoral integrity issues into the study of electoral participation would ideally employ a better and more direct measure of particularistic incentives.
Two variables found in previous studies to be associated with turnout were excluded from the analysis due to lack of suitable data. 
Results
Preliminary bivariate analysis at both individual and aggregate levels supports the hypothesis that electoral confidence fosters turnout. At the individual level, those survey respondents who reported having voted rated the fairness of the election in which they had participated 1.89 on average (recall that this scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the view that "the last election was conducted fairly" and 5 reflecting the opinion that "the last election was conducted unfairly"), while the average score for those who claimed not to have voted was 2.22, a difference significant at the .001 level. At the aggregate level, there is a correlation of .367 (significant at the .05 level) between the proportion of survey respondents who expressed full confidence in the electoral process (responded "1" to the question cited above) and official turnout (as a proportion of the voting-age population). The correlation between the proportion expressing broad confidence (those who answered either "1" or "2" to the electoral fairness question) and aggregate turnout is .265, though this coefficient fails to reach statistical significance (see Table 1 ). These findings provide prima facia evidence that confidence in the electoral process leads to increased levels of voter turnout.
But the real test of this relationship must carried out in a multivariate context. We start with a random intercepts logit model with individual-level variables only (Model 1 in Table 2 ).
This model shows that perceptions of electoral fairness have a strong and highly significant impact on willingness to cast a ballot. The control variables are virtually all significant and in the expected direction, but even controlling for the factors that have been found repeatedly in previous studies to affect turnout, perceptions of fairness still stands out as a strong predictor.
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The positive coefficient for income suggests that the mobilizing impact of vote-buying among the poor is outweighed in this dataset by the well-known tendency in democracies for those better off to vote with greater frequency, though it should be noted that this variable is less significant than most others in the model, suggesting that the countervailing influence of vote-buying (which it was not possible to test directly) may have also been at play.
It is also clear that confidence in elections has an impact independent of other legitimacy variables: though there is a fairly strong bivariate association between satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of electoral fairness (Kendall"s tau-b = .274, significant at .004) and external efficacy (Kendall"s tau-b = .089, significant at .004), this model supports the hypothesis that evaluations of electoral integrity have an impact independent of overall evaluations of the democratic system.
It is also noteworthy that party identification with a loser does not prove significant, nor does an interaction term between party identification with a loser and perceptions of electoral fairness, designed to test whether the effect of such perceptions may have been conditioned by support for an unsuccessful party (the "sour grapes" hypothesis). Finally, as we know from numerous previous studies, there is considerable variation in propensity to vote among countries (as indicated by the highly significant variance term for election intercepts), even controlling for individual-level factors.
-- Table 2 about here --Unfortunately, a number of the CSES surveys did not ask questions on union membership, religion, or political information, and because different questions were omitted in different surveys, Model 1 only includes 22 elections. 10 In order to retain enough macro-level cases for the introduction of election-level controls to be possible, those variables with significant amounts of missing data, as well as those insignificant in Model 1, were removed in Model 2.
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In Model 2, perceptions of electoral fairness were allowed to vary over elections (in other words, this is a fully-random model), and a range of election-level variables know to influence aggregate turnout were added. The results reported here are largely in agreement with expectations, though many of the variables fail to reach conventional levels of significance, presumably due to the relatively small number of macro-level cases included.
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Somewhat unexpectedly, the margin of victory (employed as a measure of the closeness of the race) is associated with increased turnout in this dataset (with no evidence of a cross-level interaction between margin of victory and perceptions of electoral fairness). Examination of the data reveal that Belarus is a distinct outlier on this variable, in that the margin of victory in the Belarusian election included in this dataset was 60 percent, whereas the next highest figure was 26.3 percent (Taiwan). When Belarus is removed from the dataset, this coefficient is no longer significant, suggesting that it is the relatively high level of turnout among Belarusian voters that accounts for this anomalous finding.
The most noteworthy aspect of this model from the point of view of the present analysis is the fact that the electoral confidence variable remains highly significant, and its coefficient has barely changed from Model 1. All in all, the relationship between perceptions of electoral fairness and propensity to vote appears to hold in across a variety of institutional and political settings, lending confidence to the robustness of the results presented here.
The final stage in the analysis was to test for cross-level interactions between perceptions of electoral fairness and the election-level variables. In other words, we are interested to know whether the impact of perceptions of electoral fairness on turnout is conditional on polity-level factors such as institutional design or aspects of electoral competition. The only such variable to come close to reaching conventional levels of statistical significance was that between perceptions of electoral fairness and the dummy variable designating established democracies (see Model 3). 13 The coefficient for this model is positive and significant at .117, which provides limited evidence that the impact of perceptions of electoral fairness on turnout is actually stronger in established democracies than it is in newly-and semi-democratic states. This could be due to the fact that citizens in established democracies hold their elections to higher standards, or it could be because the impact of electoral confidence is attenuated in some newer democracies by vote-buying or other phenomena that increase turnout under conditions of poor electoral conduct.
The latter possibility suggests that there may be a threshold of electoral confidence below which turnout is motivated by other factors. This possibility remains speculative, however, and provides grounds for future research.
A final consideration is the possibility of endogeneity, mentioned above. This is an issue that arises in the context of many attitudinal variables that are highly proximate to the voting decision, such as party identification, political interest/information, and efficacy: behavior (voting) can be expected to reinforce pre-existing attitudes, at the same time as being a consequence of them (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson et al. 2005, 26-9, 193-4; Finkel 1985; 1987; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Lassen 2005; Nadeau and Blais 1993) . The same could be true of perceptions of electoral fairness. Unfortunately the question on electoral fairness was asked only in the first module of the CSES, and it is always difficult to disentangle causal flows in cross-sectional data. Moreover, statistical "fixes" typically employed with this type of data such as instrumental variables are precluded in the present instance by the lack of efficient and exogenous instruments for perceptions of electoral fairness (the only indicators with which this variable is highly correlated are those such as satisfaction with democracy that cannot be assumed to be exogenous either). quality of elections will have changed between the two elections.
-- Table 3 about here --
The models in Table 3 provide approximate replications of the individual-level model in Table 2 This analysis also has consequences for our understanding of democratic quality.
Confidence-related abstention can have a variety of nefarious consequences for democracy. If democrats choose to exit from electoral politics in reaction to perceived flaws in electoral processes, the result may be a downward spiral in democratic performance and legitimacy. As Fabrice Lehoucq argues, "If rates of voter participation fall, then fabricating a handful of votes may be sufficient to retain power, a fact that opposition or regional parties may exploit as elections become more competitive" (2003, 253) . Similarly, McCann and Dominguez show that abstention due to perceptions of fraud helped the PRI stay in power in Mexico (1998, 498) . It is perhaps not surprising that Bingham Powell found higher levels of turnout to be associated with a lower incidence of riots and protests (1982, ch. 10).
The results presented here thus have potential implications for policy. Falling turnout has been of concern in recent years, not just among political scientists, but among political actors as well. The findings of this paper suggest that if states want to improve turnout, one measure they could take would be to increase confidence in the electoral process. The most obvious means of achieving this end is to improve the conduct of elections. States that are actively engaged in cleaning up their elections also need to make strenuous efforts in the area of voter education, in order to inform their publics of their activities and to convince them that the quality of elections has in fact improved. Moreover, the evidence presented here suggests that proposals in some countries to expand the use of postal, electronic and absent voting in order to increase turnout may actually have the opposite effect, if they simultaneously decrease confidence in the electoral process. This might be the case, for example, if such provisions were abused and stories of abuse were widely publicised.
Elections are the building blocks of democracy; it follows that electoral integrity is a precondition for meaningful democratic competition at all levels. In as much as poor evaluations of the fairness of elections keeps citizens away from the polls, democratic legitimacy and performance will be compromised. It is for this reason that the study of electoral confidence is key to understanding the role of elections in the ever-widening world of competitive politics. This paper has considered the importance of perceptions of electoral integrity for turnout, but similar analyses could profitably be extended to a range of aspects of political behavior, including vote choice and other forms of political participation. Undertaking such a task would provide a muchneeded integration of the study of electoral manipulation and malpractice with the traditional concerns of behavioralists. Turnout (A2028) was coded as a dummy variable on the basis of the relevant survey item.
"Inconsistent" responses were coded in accordance with the voter"s declared participation behavior, but use of an alternative coding, in which these responses were coded as missing data, does not alter the results of the analysis substantively. "Don"t know" and "Refused to say whether voted" were coded as missing data. Respondents under the voting age were removed.
Age (A2001) was measured in years.
Education level (A2003) was coded on an eight-point scale ranging from 1 for "none" to 8
for "university undergraduate degree completed".
Socio-economic status was indicated by relative levels of household income (A2012), measured in population quintiles.
Gender (A2002) was coded as a dummy variable for female.
Union membership (A2005) was coded as a dummy variable for union members.
Frequency of religious service attendance (A2015), employed instead of expressed degree of religiosity due to greater data availability, was measured on a six-point scale ranging from 1 for "never" to 6 for "once a week".
Majority ethnic group:
A dummy variable was created designating "1" if the respondent was a member of the majority ethnic group and "0" if he or she was a member of a minority group. This variable was created on the basis of three variables coded from CSES data: variables for religious, language, and ethnic groups. Religious majority group member (A2017) was coded "1" if the respondent was a member of the religious majority group in the country in question, and "0" otherwise. For the purposes of classification, protestant denominations were combined into a single category. If no religious group formed an absolute majority in the country in question, this variable was not coded. Linguistic majority group member (A2018) was coded "1" if the respondent was a member of the linguistic majority group in the country in question, and "0"
otherwise. If no linguistic group formed an absolute majority in the country in question, this variable was not coded. Ethnic majority group member (A2021) was coded "1" if the respondent was a member of the ethnic majority group in the country in question, and "0" otherwise. If no ethnic group formed an absolute majority in the country in question, this variable was not coded.
The composite majority group variable was coded on the basis of the three variables described above for 16 states according to data availability and functional salience. Data for all three ethnic variables were missing for the following ten cases: Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland. In four cases, only one of the above-described variables was generated (ethnicity in Lithuania, religion in Poland, language in Sweden and religion in the USA). For the remaining thirteen countries, a choice was made between variables on the basis of functional salience. Ethnicity was coded for in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Great Britain. Language was coded for in Canada, Spain and Taiwan. Religion was coded for in Hong Kong and Israel.
Party identification was coded as a dummy variable, based on replies to survey item A3004, "Are you close to any political party". "Inconsistent" responses were coded according to the stated identification/non-identification of the respondent.
Identification with a losing party/candidate was coded in terms of the questions "Are you close to any political party?" (A3004), and "What party is that?" (A3005). Some surveys also asked about identification with party blocks (A3007). The "party identification with a loser" variable was coded "1" if none of the parties identified by respondents was a winner, defined as a party/block that formed part of the government/coalition following the election, or, in the case of legislative elections held in presidential systems, the party that won the largest number of seats in the legislature (details of government formation were obtained from country notes in the CSES
Codebook as well as from various issues of Electoral Studies).
In all cases but one, the winning presidential candidate in concurrent elections was from a party coded as a winner in this way.
The exception was the US, where the winning candidate was from a different party, and winners were coded according to the presidential election result. Respondents from the Belarusian and Lithuanian surveys could not be coded because the winning presidential candidates were independents.
Political knowledge was coded in terms of a correct response to the first of the three such questions included in the Module (A2023); missing data for the second and third questions precluded their use. Political knowledge was coded as a dummy variable, where "1" indicated a correct reply to the question, and "0" indicated an incorrect response or "don"t know". In some formal boycotts depress turnout (Pastor, 1999) , but boycotts did not play a prominent role in any of the elections included in this analysis.
2 Manipulators may also use seek to demobilize the supporters of opponents, thereby decreasing turnout (Cox and Kousser 1981; Schaffer 2002; Schaffer and Schedler, 2007) , though evidence suggests that this is less frequent than vote-buying. Most case studies have found electoral manipulation to be linked to inflated turnout (e.g. Akhter 2001, 203-4; Oberst and Weilage 1990; Argersinger 1985/6, 674; Shaffer 2007b, 186-7) .
and Blais 1993). 7 The sources for these data were LeDuc et al. 1996; LeDuc et al. 2002 ; the Elections and Political Transformation in Post-communist Europe database at www.essex.ac.uk/elections; and the EPIC Project database at www.epicproject.org. 8 The analyses reported here were carried out using MLwiN version 2.02 software with restricted iterative generalized least squares (RIGLS) estimation, which is most appropriate with restricted numbers of level-two cases (Rasbash et al. 2004; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) , and predictive quasi-likelihood (PQL) approximation for equations with discrete dependent variables. * Official turnout as a proportion of the voting-age population. ** Percentage of survey respondents who answered '1' to the electoral fairness question. *** Percentage of survey respondents who answered '1' or "2" to the electoral fairness question.
See the Appendix for data sources. 
